The New Frontier
in Democratic Theory and Practice:
Organizational Forms that Simultaneously Optimize Autonomy & Community

©1997, Andrew Dinkelaker

Chapter 1b - Introducing the Four Quadrant System

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Phase Four: The Current Frontier in Democratic Theory and Practice

The proper relationship between the individual and society has been hotly debated throughout history. Some emphasized the rights of the individual while others argued that the common good and the social cohesion of the community should take precedence over the rights of the individual. But must we pit individual freedoms against the needs of the community, as if they were mutually exclusive options? Some socio-political theorists, notably those who have described themselves as “an-archists” in the original sense of the word (which means anti-state), have called into question the false assumption which creates the illusion of an apparent dichotomy between autonomy and community -- what we have previously called the Autonomy-Vs.-Community Fallacy. These theorists comprise the fourth and current phase in the development of democratic theory and practice. They are responsible for challenging the prevailing assumption that individual autonomy and social cohesion are somehow incompatible. As far as autonomy and social cohesion are concerned, they argue, one can actually have one’s cake and eat it too!! These theorists have opened the door to an exploration of an entirely new frontier in “democratic” socio-political organizational forms. How this is so will be the subject of our discussion in the remainder of this manuscript. Let us hasten to note, however, that their solution to the “problem” of reconciling freedom and community is not widely appreciated. Perhaps this is due to the marginalization of anarchists in mainstream socio-political theory. This, may be attributable, as I will try to demonstrate, to the prevailing ideologies associated with autocratic forms of social organization that have a vested interested in undermining democracy as a viable and practical option.

The brilliance of the anarchist solution is in rejecting the logic imposed by the false dichotomy. A one dimensional dichotomy was construed as the product of two separate dimensions in dialectical interaction. This is not unlike the state of affairs Edwin Abbott poetically described in his imaginative novel Flatland.27 In this book a three dimensional object, “sphere” shows up in the land of two dimensions and tries to explain to “square”, a two dimensional inhabitant of that world -- what three dimensions are. Square can see the sphere but only as a two-dimensional circle that exhibits rather bizarre behavior beyond its comprehension. When the sphere attempts to demonstrate its height, or third dimension, by “passing through” the two dimensional plane, square only sees the circle grow larger, smaller, and then completely disappear. The sphere, now above the two dimensional plane looking in, speaks to the square. However, the square cannot locate the voice of the circle he just watched “disappear”. Everything that the sphere does to convince the square of the existence of three dimensions is experienced by the square as either confusing, complete nonsense, or “magical”. It is not until the square is pulled out of the land of two dimensions and placed into three dimensions that it fully realizes the nature of the limitations of the two dimensional world that was its previous framework. Indeed, square eventually discovers that in the world of two dimensions it is not possible to express the nature of three dimensions even if one has directly had the experience of it. As a result square fails to convince others of the existence of the three dimensional world.

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Following this analogy I will present a framework that demonstrates that the debate which pits individual freedom against social cohesion has collapsed two separate and independent dimensions into one. Much like how the sphere pulled the square out of its original frame and into a larger one, we must separate and telescope out the two conflated dimensions, reconstituting the higher-dimensional socio-political frame, thereby making visible what was previously “hidden.”

Distinguishing the Two Dimensions

The framework I have in mind is a rather simple one: construct a two dimensional coordinate system in which the horizontal axis is a spectrum that measures or represents the degree of autonomy (or conversely, heteronomy) of the individual; the vertical axis represents a spectrum that measures the degree of interdependence (or conversely, independence) among individuals. Such a diagram would look like this:

Using this coordinate system and its two dimensions, four general types of socio-political system can be distinguished, associated with the Four Quadrants created by the intersecting axes.

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The horizontal axis: autonomy / heteronomy

The first dimension (the horizontal axis) is about individual freedom or the lack thereof. At the left end of the spectrum is the autonomous individual, the individual who has the ability to make decisions and act on his or her own behalf -- the self-legislating, self-determining, and self-regulating individual. At the other end of this spectrum is the individual whose life is determined by others -- the heteronomous individual.

We may think of the autonomous individual as one who finds authority within. The heteronomous individual seeks external authority. So we could conceive of the axis as a graded spectrum distinguishing the extent to which the individual prefers, and/or is capable, of self-legislation. Another way to conceive of the horizontal spectrum is in terms of the distance of the individual from those who make decisions that affect her -- as one moves right on the spectrum the individual has increasingly less control over those legislative bodies that enact laws that affect her. On the extreme left of the horizontal spectrum decisions affecting the individual are made by that individual. As we move to the right, twelve separate positions on the spectrum can be distinguished. At these respective positions on the spectrum, reading from left to right, the decisions are made:

  • by the individual
  • with the individual’s direct involvement
  • by a legislative body in which the individual has direct involvement (by consensus)

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  • by a legislative body where the individual has direct involvement, using majority rule or other methods of exclusion28

  • by an “elected” representative supported by the individual
  • by a “duly” elected representative, but not one supported by the individual
  • by a legislative body comprised of elected representatives, using various “voting” methods (for instance, majority rule)
  • by non-elected (“appointed” perhaps) legislative bodies
  • by non-elected bodies that are progressively insulated from accountability to the populace
  • by autocratic elites
  • by autocratic elites comprised of progressively smaller constituencies
  • by dictators, despotism, or tyranny

Positions on the horizontal spectrum differ with respect to the degree and type of “delegation” of authority (from the individual to others) to make decisions regarding that individual’s life. From the point of view of the autonomous individual the critical question is: How is the delegation of decision making authority legitimized at each point on the spectrum? Is any delegation of decision making ever legitimate? The preferred procedural device by which proponents of delegated authority attempt to legitimize it in our society is, without contest, majority rule as Green accurately points out: “democracy in the classical sense, and representative government in the contemporary sense, have in common that they are both legitimized in some degree by a philosophy of majority rule...”.29 But contemporary [phase four] critics of classical representative democracy call into question the legitimacy of any and all forms of delegated authority in decision making, including majority rule. In their view, it is not possible to delegate one’s personal responsibility for decision making to others. Only individuals affected by decisions are in the position to validly make them, and this authority may not be legitimately delegated. The individual is ethically compelled only to follow those laws which she has established for herself, as Thoreau intimated when he said, “the only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think is right.”30 We have been psychologically habituated to majority rule and use it without thinking. But is it valid?

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Kantian scholar Robert Paul Wolff bases his critique of majority rule on Kant’s elaboration of the concept of personal autonomy.31 Wolff challenges the validity of majority rule by pointing out that it can be shown to be mathematically inconsistent. Lanni Guiner takes a different approach to challenging majority rule; she argues that it is an essentially unfair procedure in certain circumstances -- namely, when a specific subgroup constitutes a constant minority.32 She aptly describes the flaw in majority rule as its “winner take all” mentality. A third approach involves questioning the legitimacy of delegated authority.

One can delegate authority to an individual, to a group, or to a subgroup that is identified through a particular process like majority rule. With majority rule any combination of 51% of the membership of the group is considered “empowered” to make “legitimate” decisions. This is a complex system of delegation and representation where authority is not delegated to a specific person or a specific group of people but, in the abstract, to a yet-to-be announced subset of the group, “the majority”. While majority rule increases participation in the decision making process, it offends the principle of autonomy. The vote of the majority is a legitimation ritual, the core legitimation rite in our culture. It is a highly effective form of “cultural magic” that creates the illusion of legitimacy. The minority feels psychologically and/or ethically compelled to comply with the decision as a result of participating in the process, despite the fact that their dissenting views have been neutralized. Imagine a situation in which a group of three individuals are unable to come to a unanimous decision. There is a subtle but important difference between, on the one hand, the two individuals who are in agreement deciding to part company with the third and, on the other hand, those two invoking majority rule in order to legitimize forcing the third to join them in their decision.33

The vertical axis: independence / interdependence

The second dimension (interdependence / independence) is represented by the vertical axis. What is being measured here is the interconnectedness between individuals in the group.

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Social cohesion is depicted at the upper extreme of the vertical axis. The lower extreme represents social detachment or isolation -- individual independence. If the horizontal axis is primarily about individual freedom, the vertical axis is primarily about social relationship. Individuals at the higher end of the spectrum are sensitive to their interconnectedness with their peers and their surroundings. They see themselves as context bound, are appreciative of the natural ties between people and things, and seek to bond with others. What we are ultimately talking about, with respect to the vertical spectrum, is the individual’s relationship to the social system of which he or she is a part. If the attempt to legitimize the delegation of decision making authority is the key to understanding the horizontal axis, then the key to understanding the vertical axis is that social units of varying size and scope can play the primary role in the individual’s socio-political view. At the lower end of the horizontal axis the individual takes his own person as the primary social unit of importance -- assuming a position that we could call “ego-centric”. This is the “rugged individualist” whose dream it is to “act unilaterally throughout one’s life -- never having to deal with the maze of human relationships. Being able to be arbitrary, capricious, disconnected, all-powerful. Riding down the highway of life in a powerful, irresistible car, completely detached. Never having to deal with anyone.”34 This is the lonely hero who ventures out into the world in order to tame it. Personal strength and self-sufficiency are valued. The individualist’s relationships are competitive; he seeks personal survival and success in a “dog eat dog” world. Further up the axis the individual takes the family or other small group as the primary social unit -- assuming what may be called a familo-centric position. The family is a social unit in which association is based on blood relations. Movies like “Gone With the Wind” or “The Godfather”, depict situations in which the family is everything and the worst thing that could happen would be to have oneself cast out of the family. At the next stage on the

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spectrum he or she may identify with yet larger social groups -- one’s clan, tribe, race, or gender -- assuming an ethno-centric, nationalistic, or gender specific identity. What distinguishes these groups from a family unit is that they go beyond simple blood relations as the defining characteristic of interrelatedness. Further along the axis we find the humanist who identifies with humankind as a whole. As a result, the individual is as concerned for others as she is for herself. Solidarity, harmony, and interconnectedness are cherished values. And perhaps, still further along the spectrum are positions that transcend anthropo-centrism.

Not only are the communities with which the individual identifies, as she travels up the axis, more inclusive, they are more complex systems and progressively more “open”. The independent individual at the bottom of the spectrum is, in effect, a “closed” system in the sense that significant interrelationship with the surrounding social and physical environment is denied. In fact, as one travels higher on the vertical spectrum, the individual becomes progressively more inclined to conceive of herself as the product of systemic interrelationship in contrast to seeing the social system, as the individualist does, as mere collection of individuals.

As we have already mentioned, it was Athenian democracy that most extensively explored the notion of enhanced participation of the individual in the political processes of the community, via her role as “citizen”. Anthony Arblaster describes the understanding of the relationship between the individual and society that was arrived at in Athens:

Central to the effective working of Athenian democracy was the idea of active citizenship. Citizenship did not mean mere membership in the diluted modern sense; it meant membership in the original sense, by analogy with the members or parts of the human body. It was an organic relationship which even anti-democrats like Aristotle endorsed. The state or polis was a whole, of which individuals were parts, dependent upon it and not self-sufficient, as the individual is often conceived to be in modern liberal thought. So the citizen could only flourish as a person by acting as a part or member of the whole, the community.35

According to Peter Green individualism had an extreme negative connotation. “To Pericles and his fifth-century contemporaries the private individual or idiotes, was an idiot in our modern sense, irresponsible because [he or she was] unconcerned with public affairs.”36

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The Four Quadrant System

The intersecting axes in the following diagram create four separate quadrants each with its own unique characteristics.37

Quadrant One

Quadrant one Individuals, philosophies, and organizational styles are characterized by autonomy and social independence. In Quadrant one, we locate various traditions including libertarianism and liberalism. In this Quadrant, liberty is a guiding light and individualism also reigns supreme. The “free individual” is the prototype for Quadrant one society. It is of utmost importance that the individual be unconstrained to pursue his or her personal gain. Out of this individualistic pursuit, society benefits, according to Quadrant one social philosophers like John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Hobbes who all tend to agree that the preservation of personal freedom must be guaranteed against social control. Answers to the question of how large or small this sphere of independence should be vary among Quadrant one theorists. Isaiah Berlin, in interpreting John Stuart

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Mill’s argument for the protection of liberty, describes the core value underwriting this Quadrant:

In his [Mill’s] famous essay he declares that, unless men are left to live as they wish ‘in the path which merely concerns themselves’, civilization cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the weight of ‘collective mediocrity’.38

Although we may disagree with Mill or other Quadrant one theorists, we must recognize that for them personal freedom is the defining characteristic of society -- all social good arises out of the protection of individual liberties, not, as Quadrant two theorists postulate, from a socially cohesive society.39

Quadrant Two

Quadrant two social philosophy is the flip-side, so to speak, of Quadrant one philosophy: social development is a priority over and above the needs and/or freedoms of the individual. As defined by the two intersecting axis the second quadrant has high social interdependence with low autonomy. Quadrant two social philosophers seek to articulate the “common good” and the desire to optimize social cohesion is the core organizing principle. This Quadrant is populated by individuals embracing the traditions of communism and socialism. Quadrant two practitioners feel a natural desire to strengthen societal ties and the natural bonds between individuals. And society must accordingly be on guard against those who are interested in the egoistic pursuit of individual gain. Care must be taken to align the individuals’ desires with the greater social good. The notions of private property and private capital are anathema to Quadrant two social philosophers, who seek to form worker collectives and establish universal social systems (i.e. health care and transportation). For the Quadrant two social philosopher the individual is often even construed as essentially social in nature. Karl Marx exemplifies this perspective:

For Marx, man’s [sic] essential nature ... real only insofar as it is expressed and objectified in productive activity is by definition social. ... Human production by its nature is social; every individual product is equally a social product. The notion of the independent producer as the starting point of human history is, says Marx, “one of the unimaginative fantasies of eighteenth-century romances;” in fact, he says, the further back one goes in human history, the more communal is the productive process... One

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must “above all avoid postulating ‘society’ once more as an abstraction confronting the individual. The individual is a social being.”40

Even the individual’s desires, purposes, and identity are ultimately derived from society and social interactions and are not seen as individual distinctions.

Quadrants one and two are quite obviously diametrical opposites. But Quadrants one and two are options that are relatively easy to understand as compared to Quadrants three and four. This is because, as a result of what we have called the Autonomy-Vs.-Community Fallacy, there is a tendency to conflate autonomy and social isolation/independence (Quadrant one) and to confuse social interdependence with heteronomy (Quadrant two).


Under the sway of this fallacy we are likely to recoil at the prospect of combining the words interdependence and autonomy (Quadrant four) in the same breath, or to conceive of combining independence with heteronomy (Quadrant three).

As a result, Quadrants three and four may be considered “hidden” in our culture -- and are not given adequate consideration in the typical discourse regarding the relationship between the individual and society. This a rather curious state of affairs in so far as it is primarily within Quadrant three ideologies that we in the Western world typically live.

In spite of the seeming paradox involved in articulating Quadrant three and Quadrant four social philosophies, some individual theorists have made such an attempt.

Quadrant Three

In Quadrant three independence and heteronomy are the primary values. With the first quadrant it shares the value of individual independence and is therefore somewhat anti-social in nature.41 However, unlike the Quadrant one, this area also shares the value of heteronomy with Quadrant two where it is considered appropriate and unavoidable for decisions that affect ones life to be made by others. The assumption underlying this Quadrant is that people are by and large unable to reach their own decisions as they are incapable of judging the issues and their merits for themselves. In this (Quadrant three) view it is only the “cream” of society that have the requisite decision making skills, and they will rise to the top and manage society. This philosophy of social Darwinism is

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supplemented by various elitist views that support it: the notion of increased efficiency through role specialization, expert knowledge, and so forth.42

Only those individuals who rise to the top of the hierarchy earn independence from the general conditions of heteronomy and are privileged to act beyond the limits of accountability and social responsibility. The individualistic ethos of this Quadrant is best exemplified in the individual’s striving for financial independence. Through attaining financial independence it is believed that one can transcend the surroundings into which one was born. Capitalism, as an exemplary Quadrant three social system, encourages entrepreneurial initiative, personal profit making, the accumulation and hoarding of material wealth and resources, and “climbing the corporate ladder” at the top of which, presumably, resides the much sought “independence”. The hierarchical nature of heteronomous decision making in this Quadrant, combined with induced material greed, reinforces the ethos of competition. Only the fittest survive and reach the top. The scarcity of resources is invoked to legitimate Quadrant three social philosophies that promote adversarial human interaction.43 The anaro-socialist, Gustav Landauer (1870 - 1919), captures the spirit of Quadrant three in identifying “the central trends of modern European history since 1500” as “social atomization and authoritarian centralization.”44 Quadrant three, in other words, exemplifies the current social conditions in which we find ourselves in much of the Western world.

Quadrant Four

Just as the two explicit Quadrants (Quadrants one and two) are, in some sense, mirror opposites of each other, so are the two hidden Quadrants (three and four). Quadrant four simultaneously values autonomy and interdependence, in contrast to independence and heteronomy. It is in this Quadrant that we find counter-arguments to the concentration of power through hierarchical structuring that we find in Quadrant three, and to the view that only a select few are capable of governing. Located within Quadrant four are the traditions of social anarchism, direct democracy, and the more recent theories within the fields of progressive education and psychology.45

We must clarify what we mean by the often misunderstood term anarchism if we are to appreciate the immense contribution that this socio-political tradition has made to

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the theory and practice of genuine democracy. The term is derived from the Greek word anarchos - “without a ruler”. George Woodcock gives a somewhat more expanded working definition:

Anarchism is a system of social thought, aiming at fundamental changes in the structure of society and particularly -- for this is the common element uniting all its forms -- at the replacement of the authoritarian state by some form of non-governmental co-operation between free individuals.46

At the heart of the very definition of anarchism, in other words, is the notion of interdependence (through cooperation) of autonomous persons. The common element that anarchist theorists and practitioners share is the appreciation of the inherent value of the self-determining individual within the context of free and collaborative associations, be it in the realm of politics, education, psychology, or work. According to Wilner, in William Blake’s vision in Jerusalem “the old dichotomy between individual freedom and social order disappears; the deepest and freest vision of the individual is also the social vision.”47 This is qualitatively different from Marx’s notion of the individual as social being because Blake’s vision, while including the social, also acknowledges the individual’s autonomy. Gustav Landauer was particularly interested in this combination of freedom and community. “The whole world”, he observed, “is searching for a socialism that can be achieved without infringing upon freedom.”48 Landauer argued that this unique form of socialism (which he dubbed “anarcho-socialism”) was not going to come out of Marx’s scientific approach because Marx’s views made it “impossible to value the full creativity of the autonomous will.”49 Rather, Landauer states:

anarchism and socialism had always been different expressions of the same view... anarchism as merely the negative side of what is positively called socialism. Anarchy... is the expression for the liberation of man [sic] from the idols of the state, the Church, and capital; socialism is the expression of the true and genuine community among men [sic], because it grows out of the individual spirit.50

The expression of Landauer’s and other Quadrant four theorists comes to full fruition in their arguments for decentralization and social cohesion. In addition, there is the desire to create social environments that will allow for the fullest possible expression and development of the individual. John Clark, in his book The Anarchist Moment, identifies anarchist and feminist Emma Goldman (1869-1940) as such a person, one who is equally concerned with both individual freedom and social solidarity.51

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In this Quadrant it is deemed essential for us to clearly distinguish between individuality and individualism. Individualism is basically a form of isolation and does not necessarily contribute to the development of the self or to the individual’s capacity to become self-determined. However, the notion of individuality as articulated first by the early German romantics, and later by Landauer,

stressed the uniqueness of individuals, a uniqueness which placed them beyond conformity to any general law or principle ... romantic writers more and more stress the role of the individual as a vital part of a larger organic whole. This stress did not aim at subordinating the individual to the group but rather at coordinating him [sic] with it. ...The assumption was that the individual by being completely true to himself [sic] would best represent and contribute to the character of the whole.52

In Quadrant four, the free development of the unique qualities found inherent within each individual is considered essential to the development of community.

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27. Abbott, Edwin A. (1884). Flatland.
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28. By methods of exclusion I mean methods to legitimate the exclusion of individuals from making the decision.
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29. Green. (1993). p. 4.
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30. Henry David Thoreau. (1992). Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers. p. 9.
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31. Robert Paul Wolff. (1970). In the Defense of Anarchism.
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32. 1Lani Guinier. (1994). The Tyranny of the Majority.
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33. 1When the two individuals part company with the third in the first scenario in this example they are in effect practicing “ostrakophoria”, an Athenian democratic process in which an individual is ostracized, by vote, from the decision making body. This practice was originally designed to expel potential demagogues who threaten to usurp control and undermine the democratic process. But it can also be seen as a way of reconfiguring the group to simulate consensus. The two individuals in the example decide to reform as a new but smaller group and carry out the consensus decision of that group. In consensus procedures this is sometimes referred to as asking the dissenting individual to “stand aside”. This is psychologically and ethically different, as we have pointed out above, from “compelling” the individual to comply by invoking majority rule. Although there may be no practical difference in comparing the consequent actions of individuals in the group (the two individuals in either case inact their decision), in the “standing aside” process the autonomy of the individual is acknowledged and respected. The ostrakophoria is one of two minor methodologies in Athenian democratic practice that permits a representative democracy using delegated authority to more closely simulate a consensus process. The other priniciple is “sortition” in which individuals are elected by lot to positions with term limits.
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34. Slater. (1991). p. 153.
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35. Arblaster. (1987). p. 22.
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36. Arblaster. (1987). p. 23.
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37. The development of the Four Quadrant System was inspired by Dakota Butterfield and Issac Prilleltensky. Working independently they arrived at very similar conclusions, which prefigure the Four Quadrant System. In a workshop Butterfield presented a two dimensional coordinate system to explain how participatory democracy could be analyzed into two separate factors -- “participation” and “democracy”. Although I found this breakdown to be somewhat vague, since the autonomy of the individual was not directly distinguished, the diagram suggested to me that it might be fruitful to think of democracy in terms of two dimensions -- but which two, precisely? Prilleltensky, in his attempt to develop a model of empowerment in radical psychology in The Morals and Politics of Psychology (1994), distinguished between self-determination and the interdependent collaborative processes that form a community. Adopting these two dimensions as critical ones for explaining radical democracy, I created the Four Quadrant System that I am presenting here.
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38. Michael Sandel edt. (1984). Liberalism and its Critics. p. 20.
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39. In addition to the libertarian and liberal theorists there are a number of anarchists, like Max Stirner, who identify with the highly individualistic vein of thought. These anarchists argue that all forms of social control be dissolved (i.e.. “The State”) for the sake of individual development and the fullest freedom possible to pursue whatever “good” they may desire.
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40. Eleanor Wilner. (1975). Gathering the Winds: Visionary Imagination and Radical Transformation of Self and Society. pp. 150-1.
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41. Wilner (1974) identifies the anti-social nature of capitalism stating that “individualistic capitalist society share this same inherent reinforcement of divisiveness... reinforces distrust, suspicion, and competition, turning man against man... thus interpersonal values are subverted and made subservient to selfish ones.” pp. 72-3.
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42. It is here that we will find the political theories of Plato and other apologists for oligarchy, as well as the proponents of elitism in democratic theory and the more recent assertions of Patrick Kennon and the like who argue that authority to make decisions originates in expertise.
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43. Murray Bookchin, in his book Post-Scarcity Anarchism (1971), argues that the principle of scarcity goes so far as to provide “the historical rationale for the development of the patriarchal family, private property, class domination and the state; it nourished the great divisions in hierarchical society that pitted town against country, mind against sensuousness, work against play, individual against society, and, finally, the individual against himself.” p. 9.
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44. Lunn, Eugene. (1973). Prophet of Community. p. 185.
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45. For education see John Dewey’s Democracy and Education , Paul Goodman’s Compulsory Miseducation and the Community of Scholars and Paulo Friere’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. For psychology look to Carl Rogers’ A Way of Being, Abraham Maslow’s The Farther Reaches of Human Nature and Isaac Prilleltensky’s The Morals and Politics of Psychology.
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46. Lunn. (1973). p. 76.
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47. Wilner. (1975). p. 126.
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48. Maurer, Charles. (1971). Call to Revolution. p. 165.
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49. Lunn. (1973). p. 203.
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50. Lunn. (1973). p. 200.
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51. Clark, John. (1986). The Anarchist Moment. p. 134.
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52. Lunn. (1973). pp. 109-10.
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