The New Frontier
in Democratic Theory and Practice:
Organizational Forms that Simultaneously Optimize Autonomy & Community

©1997, Andrew Dinkelaker

Chapter 5 - Participatory Democracy Deferred

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Many of the obstacles to the realization of Quadrant four are the other side of the coin of the enhancers discussed in the last chapter. If the honoring of advanced feeling and intuition enhances our capacity to establish and operate within Quadrant four type organizations, then the devaluation of feeling and intuition constitutes an obstacle. A comprehensive presentation of the obstacles to Quadrant four would sound rather repetitious in the wake our extensive discussion of the enhancers in chapter four. In this chapter I will focus on a few key obstacles. There are three obstacles that are particularly noteworthy as they arise out of arguments presented by political "progressives" and those who would see themselves as advocates of radical democracy, precisely those individuals who one would expect to be allies in the move toward an appreciation of Quadrant four. We shall call these obstacles "socio-organizational relativism", "instrumentalist arguments for democracy", and "the fragmentation and co-optation of the dimensions and functions". But first we must deal with a fourth obstacle, the "incommensurability" of Quadrant four views with the prevailing views in our society.

The Incommensurability of Rival Paradigms

By far the biggest obstacle to the realization of democracy and "liminocentric" society is the fact that we currently live almost exclusive within Quadrant three organizational forms and that Quadrant three is the shadow side of Quadrant four. Under the influence of a Quadrant three paradigm that encourages autocratic hierarchy and personal isolation, it is extremely difficult to advocate on behalf of Quadrant four. A matrix of interconnected obstacles will directly and indirectly resist any movement in that direction. Quadrant three, for example, values product over process, goals over path, rule-governed behavior over self-regulating behavior, and structure over process -- all of which are the inverse of Quadrant four values.

Apologists and advocates of Quadrant three use this to their advantage, and construe Quadrant four values as "utopian" and unrealistic. As rival paradigms that honor opposite and conflicting values the two Quadrants may be understood, in Thomas Kuhn's terminology, as incommensurable where being in one Quadrant makes it is impossible to understand the other.

The very language of the rival paradigm seems foreign and incomprehensible. From a Quadrant three perspective, Quadrant four will invariably be labeled as too chaotic and uncontrollable for anyone to effectively "manage" the processes for making decisions, producing goods, or delivering services. But in fact, the real difficulty may ultimately be in the felt need that Quadrant three practitioners have to maintain control at all costs. STs, whom we have linked to Quadrant three, according to Myers and Briggs

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characteristically have such problems and are unable to let go. Trapped in a foreign feeling rival paradigm, Quadrant four practitioners, on the other hand, may be susceptible to feelings of despondency and apathy, especially in view of popularity and momentum that Quadrant three has gained over time. In addition, overwhelmed within a Quadrant three context, many Quadrant four practitioners may themselves begin to doubt that it is possible to embody Quadrant four values or be suspect that even their successes will eventually be co-opted and assimilated into a Quadrant three mentality -- as they have so often witnessed in the past. Needless to say, all of these tendencies that we have identified as obstacles reinforce each other in resisting any changes in the move toward an appreciation of Quadrant four as a source of viable alternatives.

Socio-Organizational Relativism
or Quadrant Relativism

Here a "value neutral" stance is assumed in respect to the four Quadrants. Each of the four Quadrants represent an equally valuable form of organization. Each has its place in different situations, it is argued. In some situations hierarchy and top down decisions are what you want, in other situations a "organic adaptive" approach and so forth. Everything is "relative". In recent disputes at Goddard College, some individuals who presented themselves as spokespersons for democracy wrote: "I find it much more difficult to know exactly what mix of democratic, participatory, and authoritarian modes is appropriate... I hope that we can avoid language that uses 'democracy' or 'democratic management' only to refer to a collectivity in which all stakeholders have equal control over everything -- that makes anything else 'undemocratic.'" But this argument, like the "instrumentalist" argument, makes it easy for Quadrant three practitioners to co-opt the urge toward democracy and relegate it, in practice, to lower levels of decision making in the corporate hierarchy. Faculty, for example, may make decisions about curriculum "democratically", but critical college policy decisions are made autocratically, by the college president or a board of directors comprised of non-elected trustees.

The Instrumentalist Argument for Democracy

Here the argument for democracy is founded primarily or exclusively on principles that are essentially Quadrant three values -- for example, "in the long run democracy is the most efficient system." Even if this were true, this argument on closer inspection can be seen to be the first step in the co-optation of democracy, because it conceives of democracy's value in Quadrant three terms. Efficiency, not participation or autonomy, is the criteria by which one assesses worth in Quadrant three.

In contrast to the "instrumentalist" argument for democracy, Kantian scholar Robert Paul Wolff, in his book In Defense of Anarchism, presents what might be called the "ethical" argument for democracy. The "instrumentalist" approach values democracy

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insofar as it is instrumental in obtaining other goals which are valuable. It is argued, for instance, that democracy is a means to some other end which we value for its own sake -- efficiency, intelligence, creativity, or productivity in an organization. Persons making the "instrumentalist" argument usually try to demonstrate exactly how democracy is a means to reach these other intrinsically desirable ends.

As true and important as these instrumentalist arguments are, they have an inherent weakness. The justification for using democratic processes disappears when circumstances are identified in which democracy fails to act as an effective means to obtain these other goals. In such circumstances democratic processes can be bypassed in favor of other "more effective" or "more efficient" processes and organizational structures. For example, in a time of war or budget crisis, it might be argued, we no longer have the "luxury" of sufficient time and/or fiscal resources to devote to democratic process and must forego it in favor of faster, more efficient decision making processes (usually involving autocratic control). In contrast, the "ethical argument" for democracy is not subject to revocation in this way. There are various forms of the ethical argument, but they all seem to have in common the idea that non-democratic forms of government are all unethical because they compromise our right to self-determination (based on our essential nature, as Kant argues, as morally autonomous beings). In other words, the autonomy of the individual is itself an inalienable right, an "intrinsic good", an "end in itself". To the extent to which an organization is authoritarian (e.g. non-democratic), it is unethical, regardless of whether or not it is "efficient".

The ethical argument is harder to make than the instrumentalist argument, insofar as it requires individuals and organizations to value autonomy and self-determination, and for some (especially business types) this will require a radical shift in paradigm (from the paradigm associated with Quadrant three to the paradigm associated with Quadrant four)! But although this approach may be tougher to argue it is also the stronger of the two arguments, in the sense that it is not "conditional" on circumstances -- the obligation to act ethically requires that we honor the rights of individuals to self-determination, regardless of whether it is more efficient in any given set of circumstances to do so.

The ethical argument for democracy is not unlike similar ethical arguments against the death penalty (which would assert that killing is unethical, intrinsically wrong, and so should not be permitted, regardless of circumstances -- even when possible social benefits might be derived from such acts). Similar ethical objections to war have typically been made by conscientious objectors with various religious backgrounds. The ethical argument for democracy has been explored quite thoroughly, in particular by thinkers such as Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, Paul Goodman, and Robert Paul Wolff (individuals who consider themselves in the "anarchist" tradition).

Presumably the author of the comment, "I find it much more difficult to know exactly what mix of democratic, participatory, and authoritarian modes is appropriate", if asked to defend democracy would offer an instrumentalist defense. The instrumentalist argument often goes hand in hand with organizational relativism. For someone who embraces democracy on ethical grounds, it can never be a matter of trying to establish which blend of authoritarianism and democracy is the appropriate one, for authoritarianism is prima facie unethical. Such an individual will act out of a set of values

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that is not willing to sanction authoritarianism, and will be very concerned about envisioning forms of community and business that operate according to non-authoritarian principles. I am particularly concerned that if the instrumentalist argument is the only one that we, as progressives, choose to present we will be selling democracy down the river, and thereby compromising ourselves morally, whenever democracy becomes "too difficult" to maintain. And when is it not comparatively difficult?

The Fragmentation and Co-optation of the Dimensions and Functions

This obstacle arises when one of the two functions (N or F) or one of the two dimensions (autonomy or participation) is artificially divorced from the other and developed in isolation, in such a way that it can be exploited by apologists for organizational forms associated with the third Quadrant. We will call this "fragmentation". As one example of this phenomenon we may take the current "team- building" trend in organizational development. In addition, as an example of how feeling is devalued, to the detriment of our capacity to successfully live in Quadrant four types of organization I shall take some statements by Murray Bookchin, who elevates reason [T] to the exclusion of feeling [F]. As an example of how autonomy can be devalued by those who would exclusively optimize social cohesion again to the detriment of our capacity to enter into Quadrant four type organizational arrangements -- I will take some of the views of Suzi Gablik, an artist and writer.


One of the hottest new trends in organizational development is the building of "teams" within the workplace. These efforts are made under various names: Total Quality Management, Employee Involvement, Empowerment, Employee Participation, Kaizen, Problem Solving Teams, and Continuous Improvement Process. A number of management techniques and methodologies employ teambuilding approaches: "future search", "strategic planning", and so forth. Promoters of teambuilding argue that workers gain a number of benefits from such programs. Of the gains, it is said that with increased participation of the sort that these programs promote workers are "empowered" in various ways and given new opportunities to participate in decision making and to increase their influence in the organization. But although teambuilding does often intensify the workers' feelings of being part of the company "family", their participation in real decision making in the organization may actually be diminished, as teambuilding efforts tend to be used to break unions and dissolve worker solidarity. Decisions at the policy-making level continue -- despite teambuilding -- to be made exclusively by owners and higher level management. Indeed, it became clear to many labor leaders that teambuilding techniques were often used as instruments for efficiently "downsizing" and restructuring organizations in ways detrimental to the welfare of the worker. Increased participation of the worker,

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through teambuilding efforts, reduced worker resistance and was covertly in the service of management objectives:

General Electric's Chief Executive Officer Jack Welch posed the problem this way: "A company can boost productivity by restructuring and downsizing, but it cannot sustain high production growth without totally involving the individual who is closest to the work and there knows it better than those who manage it."1

Management consultants, using such concepts as "collaboration," "sharing," and "team work" can exploit the individual's natural desire to work together toward a common goal. Workers typically receive training in communication and interpersonal skills that, in essence, effect a "socialization" of the worker into a workplace culture preferred by management. In the course of such training they learn "appropriate" expression of feelings and emotions and, conversely, how to suppress feelings and emotions that might disrupt the team building process.

In teambuilding, not only is the increased "participation" of the worker typically encouraged without any parallel expansion of the scope of the workers' autonomy, any push for increased decision making powers on the part of the worker is likely to be construed as "adversarial" and deemed inappropriate. In the words of management guru Tom Peters "participation in the [teambuilding] effort must eventually become nonvoluntary ...everyone ultimately must hop on board, and those who dig in their heels too deeply, and for too long, must see their continuing reluctance reflected in their performance evaluations."2 In the culture produced by teambuilding, union activity is defined as counterproductive to "collaboration". Not only is there potential loss of worker autonomy and voluntary participation, in a climate that promotes unidirectional self-disclosure (on the part of workers but not management), the knowledge and cumulative experience of the worker is considered the property of the company, making the individual herself dispensable:

There's no worker democracy -- and no job security, either -- in the statistical process control pioneered by work team advocate W. Edward Deming. Once management has gathered enough information about the job, it controls exactly how a job should be run. The operator loses control of deciding when and how to make adjustments, which are instead made by a computer. ...Not only is this system more regimented than traditional methods, it makes it easier for management to further automate the work or to move the work to other locations should they choose to do so.3

For many workers the teambuilding approach is initially appealing because it promises pride in work, less supervision, democratization, and feelings of collaboration. The typical result is that workers who go through these trainings may shift in their feelings of solidarity

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away from fellow co-workers and toward management. However, many workers come to realize in the end that team building processes [F - based] have basically been used as a means of repressing the worker and replacing his/her needs with management goals, and replacing his/her right to autonomous work behavior with management's top down decisions. These trainings utilize the basic human need to form social bonds and empathize with others [F] in order to strengthen and stabilize the organizational hierarchy [ST], not for enhancing self-determination [N] and the building of democratic communities [NF]. What we have here is the "instrumentalization" of all four mental functions in the service of the profit motive. Alternately, teambuilding methodologies could be used in the service of promoting Quadrant four type social interaction and organization, but only when they are carefully scrutinized with respect to their capacity to promote autonomy. In assessing teambuilding processes in this light it is necessary to task-analyze the particular teambuilding process in detail -- asking, at every critical decision making juncture in the teambuilding procedure -- who makes the decisions?

Gablik and Bookchin

We have previously described some of the potential paths of change from Quadrant three to Quadrant four, using the following diagram:

Note how, in these two paths, Quadrant one (NT) and Quadrant two (SF) are intermediary stages in the respective paths. Yet they are also psychological "opposites" of each other, what Jung calls the "shadow side" of each other, and may have difficulties in accepting each other's views. Therefore, a hidden obstacle in these potential paths of change arises as a result of the rivalry between these two Quadrants. Quadrant one [NT] will find cogent arguments against certain aspects of Quadrant two community [F], deriding it as the product of "participation mystique", mob rule, and criticizing it for inducing conformity. Quadrant two [SF] will find fault with the Quadrant one emphasis on autonomy [N], as potentially detrimental to the community building process. And these tensions between Quadrant one and Quadrant two, coming out of their respective

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anti-"F" and anti-"N" inclinations, can be exploited by the anti-"NF" mentality associated with Quadrant three's ST preferences.

Any effective strategy for moving forward into Quadrant four would involve a kind of conflict resolution that might assist Quadrant one [NT] to work together in collaboration with Quadrant two [SF] as difficult as that may be to do. For the SF that would mean beginning to develop autonomy (or at least valuing this quality in the NT), while the NT would have to develop the feeling function (or at least valuing this quality in the SF). Quadrant one and Quadrant two must begin to create common ground, by combining their separate interests in N and F, rather than permit their combined S and T values to pull them back in the direction of Quadrant three.

As an example of what we are talking about let us take Suzi Gablik's position, as she presents it in her book The Reenchantment of Art, as representative of Quadrant two social philosophy. She argues that the future of art and society depends upon the renewal and restoration of our sense of interrelatedness. It is the separation and isolation of individuals associated with the dominant Cartesian paradigm that Gablik rightly identifies as a significant obstacle to the renewal of society. In confronting the conditions of individualism and consumerism Gablik believes that the paradigm of "participatory art" encourages the development of a place for interaction and connection. "When everything is perceived as dynamically interconnected," Gablik elaborates, "art needs to collaborate with the environment and a new sense of relationship causes the old polarity between art and audience to disappear. The essence of nonduality is what Vietnamese Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh calls realizing the nature of "interbeing."4 At the core of this new paradigm is a critical shift from "objects" to "relationships". Furthermore, Gablik accurately argues, we need to reawaken our capacity to be compassionate and "to live in the consciousness of our interrelatedness."

However, although she emphasizes our essential interconnectedness and the feelings of belonging to a larger whole [F], Gablik reacts rather negatively to the concept of autonomy. This is because she makes the mistake of confusing autonomy with isolationism and individualism, arguing that freedom and self-expression in art are outdated concepts and detrimental to the growth of community and the "partnership mode." In having taken the autonomy of the individual as an ideal, modern aesthetics locates itself "within the 'dominator' model of patriarchal consciousness rather than the 'partnership' model...".5 "Autonomy disregards relationships", she argues, " connotes a radical independence from others."6 Gablik is clearly confusing autonomy with individualism and thereby conflating the two dimensions on which our Four Quadrant System is based. For her, freedom and autonomy cannot possibly contribute to a sense of the common good or the creation of interdependence and relationship. "From the vantage point of individualism -- the vision of the self in ultimate control, whose innermost impulse is to self-assertion -- it is virtually impossible to imagine the relational pattern between individuals and society changing to a complementary partnership that is

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symmetrical and that forges mutually enhancing connections."7 Gablik is representing a perspective that is fundamentally Quadrant two in nature. Indeed, she would go so far as to try to redefine freedom in terms of relationship: "Were we to reframe our notion of freedom... to synchronize with the conceptual shift occurring in science from objects to relationships -- freedom might lie... in the accomplishment of 'bringing into relationship.'"8 But what remains, then of our notion of autonomy -- our capacity and right to self-legislate. It seems that Gablik has thrown out the baby with the bathwater. For although I may be able to bring myself into harmonious relationship with others this does not necessarily mean that I am free. Indeed, the process of alignment with others may encourage the acceptance of existing rules, traditions, and structures, not the challenging of authority, the posing of questions, or the proposing of unpopular points of view.

The consequences of the devaluation of the concept of autonomy can be clearly seen in the statements of Gablik's fellow "deep ecologists" Frederick Turner and Christopher Manes. Frederick Turner asserts that "the rules must be followed, or the freedom, the limitlessness, the generativeness, will not come about."9 But who is to determine what are the "rules" of the game? Zimmerman describes Manes' view:

In view of approaching "ecological scarcity", Manes apparently concludes that eco-activists should put into effect authoritarian measures of their own before the technological elites do so. To avoid ecological destruction and even "extinction as a civilization", we must be willing to abandon "the individualistic basis of society, the concept of inalienable rights...10

Apparently some deep ecologists, in their understandable urge to transcend the alienation endemic in western society and respond to the denaturing of our lives, focus almost exclusively on enhancing social stability and cohesion without giving nary a second thought to the potential loss of autonomy that threaten to accompany such projects. Most fail to ask who is it that currently wields the power to make decisions in our society and whether these decisions are conducive to continued authoritarianism.

With an exclusive emphasis on social cohesion and interrelatedness [F] and in the absence of any significant concern about the rights and autonomy of the individual, deep ecology is likely to be used in the service of Quadrant three powers. To avoid this pitfall and encourage Quadrant two practitioners to entertain a move into Quadrant four instead, we must show how an appreciation for, and development of, autonomy in social systems ultimately enhances social cohesion and community building. This is the approach cultural anthropologist Dorothy Lee takes to the subject of human freedom. Interestingly, Lee has focused her attention on identifying various Quadrant four cultures -- ones that simultaneously optimize social cohesion and individual autonomy. With specific examples, she demonstrates how autonomy, in some cultures, nourishes social cohesion, and vice

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versa. In her book Freedom and Culture, Lee argues against the belief that the successful formation of group must come through destroying the autonomy of the self. Her study of tribal societies around the world provides a basis for understanding group cohesion in a different light. "I have tried to show", Lee argues, "that law and limits and personal autonomy can coexist effectively, that spontaneity is not necessarily killed by group responsibility...".11 For example, within a "tightly knit society, the Navaho lives in personal autonomy. Adults and children are valued for their sheer being, just because they are. There is no urge toward achievement; no one has to strive for success. In fact, neither is there reward for success, nor is success held out as a reward for hard work."12 Lee's cross-cultural studies provide us with valuable information about how community and autonomy is simultaneously nurtured in cultures around the world. The exclusive focus that we typically find in the group development work of others on participation and cohesion is tempered by the value she places on the uniqueness of the individual being and the importance of his/her freedoms.

As a second example, let us take the views of Murray Bookchin regarding feeling. Bookchin, whose writings on ecological issues date back to the 1950's formulated the philosophy of social ecology which views the global ecological crisis primarily as a product of how we relate to each other socially. In so far as our social structures validate exploitation and hierarchy, our relationship with the natural world will reflect these destructive tendencies. If we are to become co-participants with the natural world, Bookchin correctly asserts, we must dismantle systems of domination and hierarchy. At the socio-political level Bookchin's profoundly insightful views underwrite the thesis presented in this manuscript -- namely, that there are forms of socio-political organizations that simultaneously optimize individual autonomy and social interdependence. Unfortunately, however Bookchin is guilty of downplaying precisely those psychological functions -- feeling and intuition -- that we have linked to a readiness for Quadrant four. He is thereby contributing to prejudices that inadvertently and indirectly make it more difficult to appreciate Quadrant four modes of organization and interaction.

Bookchin appears to take rationality [T] as the exclusive remedy to hierarchy and domination. He glorifies the liberating nature of "dialectical naturalism" (a higher form of rationality -- indeed, an advanced form of rational empiricism), while devaluing the role of (developed) feeling and intuition in the process of change leading to an ecological society. Furthermore, in Remaking Society, Bookchin perceptively distinguishes higher and lower forms of reason -- discerning, in effect, distinct levels of what Jung would call the "thinking" function:

Reason, in its power to be employed speculatively beyond the existing state of affairs, was becoming a crude rationalism, which was based on the efficient exploitation of labour and natural resources. Science, in its searching probe of reality and its underlying order, was turning into a cult of scientism, which was little more than the instrumental engineering of control over people and nature. Technology, with its promise of ameliorating labour, was turning into a technocratic ensemble of means for

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exploiting the human and non-human world. The anarchist theorists and the libertarian utopists, despite their understandable belief that reason, science, and technics could be creative forces for remaking society, voiced a collective protest against the reduction of these forces to purely instrumental ends.13

This, and other passages, demonstrate that he has accurately discerned distinct levels in one of the four mental functions identified by Jung -- "thinking". Although the distinction is a rudimentary one, establishing only two levels, an advanced form of thinking (critical reason) is nonetheless distinguished from a less advanced form ("instrumental" reason). Bookchin does not similarly distinguish advanced and underdeveloped forms of feeling and intuition. This causes us to suspect, using Jung's typology, that he is most likely a "thinking" type which then leads us to the conclusion that feeling is his inferior function. Whether or not this is true, it is indisputably demonstrable that it is the feeling function that he most often mocks, as a target for ridicule, intuition comes in as a close second. This is demonstrated by the following three passages:

Unless we know what nature is and what humanity's and society's place in it is, we will be left with vague intuitions [N] and visceral sentiments [F] that neither cohere into clear views nor provide a guide for effective action.14

The intuitional [N] approach to history is no improvement over that of conventional reason -- indeed, it does the opposite: it literally dissolves historical development into an undifferentiated continuum and even into an ubiquitous, all embracing one.15

Even the "interrelatedness" which is cherished by "feeling" types as an advanced expression of the feeling function, is sometimes viewed with suspicion by Bookchin:

Vital as the idea of "interconnectedness" [F] may be to our views, it has historically often been the basis of myths and supernatural beliefs that became means for social control and political manipulation.16

Although Bookchin does not discern "instrumental" levels of the remaining three mental functions, other socio-political theorists do. Zipes refers to the "instrumentalization of fantasy": "...the total immersion of culture by a technology politically and socially geared to curtail critical thinking and autonomous decision-making leads to a rationally totalitarian society. In this regard, the mass media function to curb the emancipatory potential of creative art and can serve to instrumentalize fantasy [N]."17 And Arlie Russell Hochschild mentions the "instrumentalization" of the feeling function: "What is new in our time is an increasingly prevalent instrumental stance toward our native capacity to play, wittingly and

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actively, upon a range of feelings [F] for a private purpose and the way in which that stance is engineered and administered by large organizations."18 Furthermore, in those passages in which Bookchin can be construed to be comparing the mental functions, we can see (from the psychological "theory of types" point of view) that he always stacks the deck in favor of reason -- by comparing advanced levels of thinking with what we have seen (in our previous chapters) to be underdeveloped levels of feeling or intuition!! As we have seen in the above passages Bookchin compares "critical reason" (which is assessed as level four thinking by others) to "sentimentality" (level one feeling), "vague intuitions", and "supernatural beliefs" (level one intuition).

If, conversely, we were to compare higher levels of feeling (interactive empathy, sociability, even "solidarity") with lower level thinking (instrumental reason), we might find ourselves arriving at very different conclusions regarding the role that these functions (and the personality types associated with them) might play in socio-political transformation processes.19

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1. International Representative Stephen Tormey. After Quality Circles It's the Team Concept. UE News. (4/20/90). [a union newsletter]
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2. Tormey. (4/20/90).
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3. Tormey. (4/20/90).
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4. Gablik. (1991). pp. 150-51.
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5. Gablik. (1991). p. 62.
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6. Gablik. (1991). p. 62.
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7. Gablik. (1991). p. 170.
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8. Gablik. (1991). p. 69.
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9. David Ray Griffin. ed.. (1990). Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality,Political Economy, and Art. p. 153.
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10. Michael Zimmerman. (1994). Contesting the Earth's Future: Radial Ecology and Postmodernity.
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11. Dorothy Lee. (1959). Freedom and Culture. p. 14.
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12. Lee. (1959). p. 10.
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13. Murray Bookchin. (1989). Remaking Society. p. 125.
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14. Murray Bookchin. (1995). The Philosophy of Social Ecology. p. 3.
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15. Bookchin. (1995). p. 9.
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16. Bookchin. (1995). p. 4.
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17. Zipes. (1979). p. 100.
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18. Hochschild. (1983). p. 20.
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19. Zipes (1979) similarly argues that the types of imagination that we have associated with higher levels of intuition can be used to "subvert instrumental rationality" (p. 95). He describes "an autonomous exercise of the imagination which endows the creator with a sense of his or her own power and challenges the self-destructive dictates of reason". (p. 94) What he has in mind here is the "dehumanizing forces of rationalism" associated with the instrumental rationality of capitalism.
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